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19 Collective intentionality, complex 
economic behavior, and valuation 
John B. Davis 
'We think, therefore we are.' (Shaftesbury, 1900 [1963], vol. 2, p. 275) 
In this chapter I depart from the standard view of the individual in economics 
as an atomistic being to consider the individual as a socially embedded being. 
There are of course many different ways of understanding individuals as socially 
embedded; the conception I employ, however, is based on collective intentionality 
analysis, particularly as formulated by Raimo Tuomela. There is an advantage to 
economic analysis in doing this. Whereas other views of social embeddedness 
are holistic, and reason mostly in terms of social entities, collective intentionality 
analysis is explicitly an account of individuals, albeit in a particular kind of 
social setting. This makes it possible to compare the understanding of economic 
behavior that emerges from a collective intentionality analysis of individuals 
with the understanding of economic behavior associated with the standard 
rationality view of individuals as atomistic beings. Further, as an account of 
individuals, collective intentionality analysis also offers a way of understanding 
the seemingly paradoxical idea that individuals can be socially embedded and 
yet remain distinct beings. The basic idea derives from our understanding of first 
person plural intentions, or we-intentions. Only individuals form such intentions, 
just as only individuals form first person singular intentions, or I-intentions, 
but we-intentions effectively embed social relationships in individuals. This 
contrasts with holist accounts of social embeddedness that rather run the risk 
of eliminating individuals when they embed individuals in social relationships. 
Collective intentionality analysis thus allows us to both talk about socially 
embedded individuals specifically as individuals, and compare their behavior 
to that of atomistic individuals. Finally, since individuals form both kinds of 
intentions, combining accounts of behavior understood in collective intentionality 
terms - what I characterize as deontologically rational behavior - with accounts 
of behavior understood in instrumentally rational terms, offers foundations for 
a complete account of individual economic behavior. I suggest that economic 
behavior in such accounts should be considered complex. 
Determining the extent to which individuals are deontologically rational rather 
than instrumentally rational in economic life seems to be in part an empirical 
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question of the extent to which individuals are active in social settings in which 
they express themselves in we-intention terms. In the discussion here, I restrict 
my attention to smaller, relatively cohesive, institutionally well-structured social 
settings - social groups - on the assumption that shared intentions are more 
likely to have specific consequences for individual behavior in these sorts of 
circumstances than in larger, more diffuse, loosely organized social settings.1 My
argument for this assumption is not that smaller social groups more effectively 
monitor or discipline individual action -this would reduce deontologically rational 
to instrumentally rational behavior - but'trather that smaller groups have stronger 
prospects of producing determinate outcomes, and this reinforces individuals' 
commitment to their shared intentions. Compare, for example, the need an 
individual feels in a place of employment to act upon relatively well-defined 
intentions shared with other employees ('we need do our respective jobs to meet 
our production deadline') versus the lesser need an individual feels in larger, more 
loosely organized social settings to act upon vague intentions that may only be 
weakly shared by others ('we need to do something about inflation'). Focusing on 
mid-sized social groups, therr, essentially operationaliies collective intentionality 
analysis for economics by emphasizing the kinds of behavioral consequences that 
have been the subject of atomistic individual rationality analysis. 
Section 1 briefly discusses social groups. Section 2 then reviews Tuomela's 
contribution to collective intentionality analysis. In section 3 I turn to how the 
socially embedded individual conception explained in collective intentionality 
terms involves a view of individual economic behavior distinct from that 
involved in standard rationality theory. A different view of normative reasoning 
associated with. a collective intentionality analysis of the socially embedded 
individual conception in discussed in Section 4. Finally, section 5 offers 
concluding remarks. 
Social groups 
Social groups that are relatively cohesive and well-structured have been 
extensively investigated in sociology, anthropology, and social psychology. 
A social group may be characterized as (1) a plurality of individuals tied to 
one another by (2) some principle of membership that implies (3) a system 
of individual rights and obligations. A social group is not the same thing as a 
social category (such as income class, ethnicity, gender, etc.), which researchers 
employ to classify or group individuals according to a set of characteristics 
which the researcher selects. Groups, rather, are collections of individuals whose 
shared characteristics derive from their interaction with one another. Of the 
characteristics of social groups surveyed in the recent literature, I emphasize the 
following as particularly relevant to the analysis of mid-sized social groups in 
economic life: that individuals engage in repeated interaction, that they define 
themselves as members of a group, that they are defined by others as belonging 
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to the group, that they share and observe group rules and norms, and that 
they participate in a set of interlocking roles that are central to how the group 
functions (Cartwright and Zander 1968, p.48). 
One advantage of construing groups in these terms is that it is allows us to 
say that groups need not operate.on a face-to-face basis. Much sociological, 
anthropological, philosophical, and social psychological research focuses on 
small groups that do exhibit regular face-to-face contact. Indeed, in the limit a 
relationship between two people can be seen as a kind of group if those individuals 
see themselves as being in some type of repeated interaction with one another 
and observe rules and nonns which determine roles for them in the relationship. 
Margaret Gilbert uses as one of her main examples the idea of two people 'taking a 
walk together' (Gilbert, 1989). Were 'taking a walk together' a regular interaction 
between two individuals, on the understanding here they would constitute a group. 
More long-lasting relationships of all kinds between two individuals, then, would 
also qualify as instances of groups. In economic life, however, groups are generally 
seen as being larger, somewhat more impersonal, and not infrequently involve 
limited or even no face-to-face contact (firms, unions, cartels, governments, etc.), 
and this is the sort of case I focus upon in order to concentrate on,individuals' 
social embeddedness. The two-person limiting case kind of group, however, 
would still be worth investigating in economics to explain recurring market 
interactions between individuals, where trust relationships are better modeled 
along the lines of group behavior than in standard atomistic individual terms. 
But I do not address this sort of case here, in order to avoid needing to include 
sympathy or empathy as elements or factors in the analysis. 
Toomela's analysis 
The philosophical literature on collective or shared intentionality distinguishes 
we-intentions corresponding to use of 'we' language from I-intentions 
corresponding to use of 'I' language. We-intentions are explained as a-.structure 
of mutually.reinforcing, reciprocal attitudes shared by individuals in a social 
group. Important contributors have been Bratman (1993, 1999), Gilbert (1989, 
1996), Searle (1990, 1995), and Tuomela (1991, 1995). Others, such as Etizioni 
(1988), have also distinguished 'I' and 'we' thinking, without employing the idea 
that shared intentionality can be described as a structure of mutually reinforcing, 
reciprocal attitudes. An advantage ofTuomela's work is its specifically individual 
focus. Though he sometimes informally refers to intentions being shared, he 
also emphasizes that this is not meant to literally imply that we-intentions 
exist in society apart from individual we-intentions. Rather, a we-intention is 
defined as an individual's attribution of an intention to the members of a group 
to which the individual belongs, based on that individual both having that we­
intention and also believing that we-intention is. held by other individuals in 
the,-same group. That is, I can only use 'we' language that pertains to you and 
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I, if I think that you would similarly apply it to you and I. Thus, expressing 
we-intentions is a matter of whether there exists a set reciprocal attitudes, not 
whether there is an actual sharing of attitudes. Indeed, in theJimit an individual 
could have a we-intention that no other individuals have, if that individual 
were simply mistaken about others' we-intentions. Thus, a we-intention is not 
a supra-individual group intention separate from the attributions individuals 
make to groups, and when people use expressions such as, 'the intentions of the 
group', this is just a shorthand device for referring to a collection of individua� 
we-intentions on the part of individuafs in the group. 
Tuomela's analysis of what he regards as the 'standard case' is as follows. An 
individual expressing a we-intention assumes that it is mutually believed that 
the we-intention is held by other group members. Consider the case in which an 
individual's we-intention is rooted in an attitude ('fear'), which the individual 
believes other group members also attribute to the group. For an individual A 
who is a member of a group G, 'A we-fears that X if A fears that X and believes 
that it is feared in G that X and that it is mutually believed in G that X is feared 
in G' (Tuomela 1995, p. 38). 'X is mutually believed' if not only do I believe 
others believe X, but they also believe that I believe X. 2 On this basis, A might
suppose that 'group G has some intention' reflecting 'G's fear of X' (say, whether 
the group will avoid some danger). Of course A can only surmise that others in G 
have the same fear and also that the fear of X is mutually believed by members 
of the group. The strongest case using the idea that X is 'mutually believed' (a 
shared belief) would involve saying that the fear that X is iteratively believed by 
everyone. But Tuomela allows 'mutual' to have strong and weak interpretations, 
because groups themselves have strong and weak criteria for supposing their 
members share a belief, attitude, or intention. The main point is that we-attitudes 
are a group attitude not in the sense that a group over and above its members 
has an,attitude towards something, but in the sense that individuals 'generally' 
in a group have some such attitude that they express in 'we' terms. Thus saying 
that they 'generally' have a we-attitude depends not just on the,mutual belief 
condition, but on both conditions which when combined provide us with a reason 
to suppose that individual members of a group are justified in saying what they 
(that is, 'we') intend.3
Tuomela uses this framework to distinguish between rules and norms, and I 
refer the reader to his work for a fuller account. Rules are the product of an explicit 
or implicit agreement brought about by some authority, and used to determine 
a distribution of tasks and activities to individuals. Rules may be formal and 
written, such as laws, statutes, regulations, charters, bylaws, etc., or they may 
be informal agreements between individuals, sometimes orally established and 
sometimes silently agreed to. In contrast, in the case of norms a network of mutual 
beliefs substitutes for actual agreements between individuals in determining 
distributions of tasks,and activities across individuals. As with we-intentions 
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generally, mutual beliefs are beliefs reciprocally established between individuals, 
such that each believes that others have the same belief, and each also believes 
that others think the same about the others, and so on in a structure of reinforcing, 
mutually held beliefs. 
Rules and norms are both understood to have motivational force, meaning 
that they constitute reasons for action on the part of the individuals who accept 
them. Indeed,rules and norms are typically framed as 'ought' principles, and 
impose requirements on individuals as members of groups in the form of specific 
prescriptions for individual action. Formally, individual A feels obliged to do 
X, because A is a member of the group with a we-intention whose consequence 
is a rule or norm to the effect, 'we believe members of the grqup should do 
X.' But rules and norms are different in virtue of the different means by which 
they enforce a distribution of tasks and activities among individuals (Tuomela 
1995, pp. 22-24). The prescriptive force of rules derives from there being 
sanctions that apply, whether formal/legal or informal, to those individuals 
who do not observe them. In contrast to rules, sanctioning with norms takes 
the form of approval or disapproval on the part of others. Because norms are 
internalized by individuals, in that they themselves accept them as reasons for 
acting, individuals apply others' potential disapproval to themselves, as when 
feeling shame or embarrassment. 
In Tuomela's framework, then, it can be said that rules are the basis for 
institutions, and norms are the basis for social values. While it is true that 
many institutions also involve norms, as relatively settled social arrangements, 
institutions generally place greater reliance on rules. In contrast, since social 
values are rarely rooted in agreements, even informally, they usually place little 
weight on rules. Rather, social values reflect systems of mutual belief about 
individuals' interaction with one another. Thus when individuals create and/or 
change institutions, they adopt new rules, and produce new we-attitudes that 
define group action within an institutional framework that can be characterized 
in terms of agreements and corresponding sanctions. When individuals develop 
and/or influence °Social values, they adopt new norms, and produce new we­
attitudes that define group action within a social value framework based on their 
mutual beliefs and systems of approval and disapproval. In both frameworks, 
rules/institutions and norms/social values, we-intentions are the foundation 
for understanding group action. Individuals thus influence institutions and 
social values as members of groups, and group action is the intermediate link 
between individual action and supra-individual institutions and social values 
missing from mainstream accounts of individuals' influence on institutions 
and social values. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that rules and norms can create different 
types of obligations -sometimes implicitly, sometimes ·explicitly - for individuals 
in terms of how different tasks, rights, and positions apply to different individuals 
Collective intentionality, complex economic behavior, <and valuation 391 
in groups. Tuomela characterizes an individual's position within a particular 
group in terms of that individual's tasks and rights within that group. An 
individual's tasks and rights are then further distinguished according to whether 
they flow from rules or norms operating within the group, that is, whether 
they are rule-based tasks and rights or norm-based tasks and rights. In contrast, 
across groups, individuals' social positions are understood in terms of the whole 
array of actions that individuals are required and permitted to do across various 
economic and social settings. These social positions assign individuals a variety 
of different tasks whose performance, is in each instance protected by rights, 
where these tasks-rights combinations may themselves exist within established 
modes of implementation that are also understood in tasks-rights terms. The 
overall framework thus explains individual rights and duties within and across 
groups in terms of tasks-rights pairs that ultimately have we-attitudes in groups 
as their foundation. 
A revised view of individual economic behavior 
The behavior of atomistic individuals is understood in instrumentally rational 
terms, because individual objective functions are defined solely in terms of 
individuals' own preferences. With no basis for action other than theirown 
preferences, and putting aside that they might act out of habit .or behave 
irrationally, atomistic individuals can do nothing other than seek to satisfy their 
own preferences. In contrast, when we treat individuals as socially embedded, 
we no longer say that individuals act only on their own preferences, because 
they also act in accordance with those rules and norms which function as 
'ought' principles-what I have termed a deontologically rational or perhaps a 
rationally principled type of behavior. But proponents of the atomistic individual 
conception understand rule-following and norm-observance in instrumentally 
rational terms. Are 'ought' principles operating in social groups then better 
explained in instrumentally rational terms? Is instrumental rationality a sufficient 
explanation of individual behavior? There seem to be three objections to saying 
that something other than instrumentally rational behavior is involved here. I 
respond to each objection. 
First objection 
One way in which to argue that observing rules and norms which have the force 
of 'ought' principles is still fully within the compass of instrumentally rationality, 
is to maintain that the individual becomes subject to constraints additional to 
those usually assumed in standard constrained optimization analysis, namely, 
constraints associated with group membership. Though these additional 'social 
group? constraints further narrow.individuals' choice sets, individuals would 
still maximize preferences, suggesting that socially embedded individuals are 
not significantly different from atomistic individuals. This argument, however, 
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ignores what is involved in saying that individuals observe rules and norms on 
account of their sharing intentions with others regarding those rules and norms. 
Shared intentions are those intentions which individuals ascribe to the groups 
of which they are members. But as intentions, they must stem from individual 
objective functions rather than constitute constraints on those objective functions. 
That is, shared intentions are like our ordinary intentions in expressing what 
individuals choose to do rather than what they are limited to doing. It is true 
that individuals in groups are more constrained in their behavior as compared 
to when they act outside of groups. But this type of constraint has an intended 
aspect, and is consequently different from the usual sort of constraint that is 
entirely external to the individual. 
Second objection 
A second argument for explaining shared intentions in instrumentally rational 
terms accepts that shared intentions stem from individual objective functions, 
but argues that they express individual we-preferences, just as ordinary 
individual intentions express an individual's own preferences (or I-preferences). 
We-preferences have been analysed by Sugden, and characterized as team 
preferences (Sugden 2000; also cf. Bacharach 1999). Sugden explicitly rejects 
collective intentionality analysis as developed by Tuomela, Gilbert, and others, 
on the grounds that it assumes individuals are bound by obligations or 'ought' 
principles, which he regards as inconsistent with an account of instrumentally 
rational behavior (Sugden 2000, pp.189-90). To preserve the latter, he reasons, 
the former has to go. :fhis implies that rules and norms are things that members 
of teams prefer to observe rather than believe they ought to obsewe. Moreover, 
if we-intentions are really the product of we-preferences, then it seems that 
it is no longer necessary to say that individuals in teams (or groups) need to 
be treated as socially embedded, since the obligations or 'ought' principles 
they observe are what they prefer. Sugden essentially draws this conclusion 
when he argues that the 'existence' question regarding whether teams and other 
groups exist (and therefore can act as agents) is independent of the theory 
of instrumental rationality enlarged to include we�.preferences. Were groups 
thought to be agents over and above their members, there clearly would be a 
stronger case for saying that their obligations and 'ought' principles were not 
always preferred by their members. 
Sugden's argument, accordingly, depends on supposing that we-preferences 
do not really impose obligations or 'ought' principles on individuals. Why is 
it, then, that Tuomela and other proponents of collective intentionality analysis 
claim that this is a necessary dimension of we-intentions? The answer lies in their 
analysis of shared intentions as sets of reciprocal attitudes across individuals in 
groups. Though shared intentions are indeed individual intentions, unlike team 
preferences, which represent only what an individual independently prefers for 
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the team, an individual's shared intention is one element in a set of reciprocal 
attitudes. Thus, when individuals ascribe intentions to groups of which they are 
members, this represents not what they prefer to ascribe to the group, but rather 
what they believe to be the group's intention based on what they believe that 
they and other group members believe to be the group's intention. On this view, 
shared intentions imply 'ought' principles, because individuals share an intention 
over which they have very limited influence. Indeed, this combination of sharing 
an intention and having it stand over opeselfhelps explain the particular quality 
of 'ought' principles as binding precepts that individuals nonetheless embrace. 
Preferences, by comparison, have but one master, namely, the individual. 
It is true that team preferences do have a shared aspect to them. But absent a 
set of feedback connections between individuals, such as Tuomela describes for 
shared intentions, the shared nature of team preferences is simply the result of an 
accidental alignment of individuals' we-preferences about teams of which they 
are members. Team members may happen to share preferences about the teams 
they are on. Yet if these preferences regarding the team begin to diverge, there is 
nothing in the interaction between individuals that brings about an adjustment in 
individuals' preferences regarding the team. Indeed, there are many examples of 
teams in the real world which operate on the basis of Sugden's team preferences, 
and as a result break down, simply because individuals are driven by what they 
prefer rather than by what they believe obligates them. The problem, basically, 
is that, with we-preferences, just as with ordinary individual preferences, de 
gustibus non est disputandum. That is, individuals retain their atomistic status, 
and the 'teams' of which they are members do not exist as teams in the customary 
sense of the term. 
Third objection 
These conclusions, however, suggests a third argument regarding how 
instrumental rationality might be sustained vis-a-vis collective intentionality 
analysis. Suppose that we treat rules and norms as conventions understood as 
coordination equilibria (Lewis 1969). Then using evolutionary game theory, 
individuals can be seen as instrumentally rational players who seek the best 
possible response to one another's individual strategies (a Nash equilibrium), and 
rules and norms can be explained as endogenously determined sets of reciprocal 
expectations. This would allow for a feedback/adjustment process, as operates in 
collective intentionality theory, but it would not explain this process in terms of 
'ought' principles. Rather, following Hume's view of conventions, individuals 
find it in their interest to conform to rules and norms to which they expect 
others will confoqn. There are different ways of explaining why individuals 
would find this in',their interest. Hume relied on sentiments of approval and 
disapproval, and indeed used this as the basis for his theory of justice. Since a 
system of justice implies 'ought' obligations, this game theoretic/instrumental 
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rationality framework can also be argued to explain the 'ought' content of rules 
and norms, whether in moral or pragmatic terms. But in contrast to collective 
intentionality analysis, 'ought' principles in this instance derive from what 
individuals find to be in their interest. 
In collective intentionality analysis, 'ought' principles derive from shared 
intentions, and shared intentions are explained in terms of individuals' use of 
first person plural 'we' language. Barring cases of deceit, first person plural 'we' 
language cannot be explained in terms of first person singular 'I' language, unless 
one denies elemental differences in human language, and engages in a reductionist 
sort of reasoning that has no support among linguists. In collective intentionality 
analysis, the reason that shared intention implies 'ought' principles is that they 
require a commitment on the part of the individual absent in the case of ordinary 
intentions that can be expressed in first person singular terms. Thus it seems clear 
that 'ought' principles that derive from collective intentionality analysis are not 
reducible to 'ought' principles that might einerge from a Humean framework. 
But this does not imply that the latter involves an unacceptable account of 'ought' 
principles, or that this account should be eliminated to produce one of 'ought' 
principles cast exclusively in shared intention and commitment terms. Rather it 
seems that both reductionist arguments should be rejected, because neither goes 
through, and because both are part of the view that thinking about individuals 
and society can be explained in terms of two inalterably opposed intellectual 
traditions: methodological individualism and methodological holism. Indeed, 
both accounts of 'ought' principles arguably have real world foundations. Just as 
there are teams that operate ( often poorly) in terms of individual we-preferences, 
so there are 'ought' principles based on instrumentally rational behavior. Just as 
there are social groups that operate (usually more successfully) in terms of we­
intentions, so there are 'ought' principles based on individual commitment. 
My position is that individual behavior is complex in being rooted in both 
types of intentions. The challenge economists consequently face is in determining 
both the rrµx of types of behavior �sociated with different kinds of intentions, 
and in properly ascribing each kind of behavior to the correct real-world 
circumstances. Much mainstream econon;rics, because of its adherence to the 
atomistic conception of the individual, imperialistically imposes instrumental 
rationality arguments on social settings where it does not apply. In using,the 
wrong explanation in the wrong circumstances, mainstream economists impose 
'thin' institutional explanations that overlook how the functioning of some social 
groups and institutional structures depends upon 'ought' princigles stronger 
than can be explained in instrumentally rational terms. The holist economics 
tradition, in contrast, has at times been equally imperialistic, though in reverse 
direction, in using social whole-type explanations in circumstances for which 
they do not apply. These 'thick' institutional explanations overlook the extent to 
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which individuals are relatively free of shared intentional experience, as well as 
individuals' need for navigating across social structures. 
I do not attempt here to set forth a specific account of individual economic 
behavior as complex. There are a variety of different ways in which the two 
can be related.4 But consider an example. Suppose an employee in a business is
assigned a set of rule and norm-based tasks associated with doing a particular 
job. If one rule is to invoice customers by the end of the month, and the norm for 
how this is to be done is to include in the invoice a complete description of all 
purchases made by those customers, ilie individual assigned these tasks is likely 
still free to perform them in a variety of ways (inquire as to customer satisfaction, 
pursue follow-up orders, institute new record-keeping practices, etc.). How well 
individuals do their assigned jobs, then, can be a matter of the extent to which 
they also act on their own preferences regarding the way a job is best done. They 
consequently act in an instrumentally rational way when already behaving in a 
rationally principled manner. 
Normative reasoning and the conception of the individual as socially 
embedded 
Deontologically rational behavior need not be normative in raising explicitly 
ethical issues, but it can be. Moreover, a specifically normative deontologically 
rational behavior might take on a variety of value forms according to the range 
of values operating in social groups. Thus in·contrast to the more narrow 
normative framework standardly associated with instrumentally rationality 
analysis, valuation in collective intentionality analysis is complex and multi­
dimensional. Following Amartya Sen, we might refer to this enlarged normative 
framework as a 'deontic-value inclusive consequentialist' framework (Sen 2001, 
p. 64). As he explains it,
It is neither that 'the good' comes first, and then 'rights and duties', nor that rights 
and duties congeal first,followed by the good, but that they are linked concepts that 
demand simultaneous consideration. While considerations of freedoms, rights and 
duties are not the only ones that matter (for example, well-being does too), they 
are nevertheless part of the contentions that we have reason to take into account in 
deciding on what would best or acceptable to do. The issue surely is simultaneity. 
(Sen 2001, p. 61, emphasis in original) 
Here I address how normative values might arise and operate not just in social 
groups but in organizations and institutions generally, or, as it has recently been 
expressed, whether we may treat 'values as partly endogenous to the economic 
system, and economic systems and their performance as partly junctions of people :S­
values' (Ben-Ner and Putterman 1998, p. xvii; emphasis in original). I begin by 
contrasting the standard view of how normative values operate in organizations 
made up of atomistic individuals. Essentially following Hume, the standard 
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account attempts to explain how conventions that lack a normative character in 
themselves can nonetheless come to acquire the status of moral norms. 
'Moral' sentiments in organizations and institutions 
Hume took a system of justice to be a set of conventions that arise when 
individuals come to expect one another to behave in regular and predictable 
ways (Hume 1739 [1888]). Individuals abide by a system of justice, because 
they find it in their interest to conform to its rules when they expect others to 
conform to them as well. The idea that such rules are 'conventional' comes 
from supposing that there are different possible rules of justice, and those 
that actually come about reflect a history of contingent interactions between 
people. Nothing a priori moral underlies actual systems of justice, making them 
for Hume not 'partly' but entirely 'endogenous to the economic system.' But 
why, then, should such rules be thought normative in nature? Why should they 
be thought to be anything more than simply persistent regularities in social 
behavior akin to other regularities that have no one believes have normative 
content? Hume's view, based on eighteenth-century Scottish-school psychology 
of sympathy, was that conformity with such regularities evokes sentiments of 
approval, and failing to conform with them evokes sentiments of disapproval. 
When these sentiments become widely shared and become attached to an idea 
of the general good, he believed they may then be characterized as a moral 
approval and disapproval. A system of justice, then, is ultimately nothing more 
than a relatively settled set of conventional expectations between individuals 
chiefly concerned with their own interest that is reinforced by sentiments of 
approval and disapproval. 
This conception has been modified and redeveloped in recent years by Lewis 
and Sugden. For Lewis, conventions are coordination equilibria (Lewis 1969). 
Coordination equilibria can be explained in game-theoretic terms with players 
acting on individual strategies to achieve a common expectation regarding which 
individual strategies offer the best reply to one another (that is, they are Nash 
equilibria). Hume's psychoiogy of sympathy is replaced by the characterization of 
individuals in terms of strategies, but any norms that emerge are still conventional 
and entirely endogenous to the economic system. Sugden similarly explains 
conventions in terms of individuals' expectations of one another conforming 
to regularities in behavior, but adds a concern individuals are said to have over 
incurring others' resentment as an emotion underlying conformityto conventions 
(Sugden 1986, 1989). When this emotion operates widely to reinforce individuals' 
adherence to conventions, Sugden suggests that normative expectations obtain 
among them (Sugden 1998). But against this it might be said that the emotion 
of resentment deserves the label 'normative' as much as Hume's approval and 
disapproval deserves the label 'moral.' Sugden argues in reply that this criticism 
misses the point behind providing a Humean naturalistic analysis of values. 'In 
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such an analysis, the definition of a moral sentiment has to be naturalistic; one 
cannot then object that some of the sentiments allowed by the definition are not 
"really" moral' (Sudgen, 1998, p. 84). 
In my view, such a response is question-begging. The claim that 'moral 
sentiments' are just that, namely, somehow •moral', needs a stronger defense than 
the suggestion that it should be possible to explain moral values naturalistically, 
and that therefore there must exist such things as 'moral' sentiments. Indeed, 
making this sort of argument seems to involve exactly what G.E. Moore famously 
labeled the 'naturalistic fallacy' (Moote 1903). Note also, that the program of 
producing a naturalistic account of normative values is closely associated with 
the aim of producing a positivist interpretation of moral -life. Sudgen is explicit 
about this connection, asserting that economists 'trained in a positivist tradition' 
must seek to explain normative values without 'assuming the existence of moral 
facts' (Sugden 1998, p. 76). A moral fact is a fact about something being right 
or wrong, good or bad; etc. For example, one might say it is a fact- specifically 
a moral fact - that it is wrong to needlessly harm another person. To deny that 
moral facts exist is to say there is nothing in society or nature that can be described 
in normative terms as a matter of fact. Normative >1alues, rather, are subjective 
judgments, and must accordingly be explained in terms of some sort of 'moral' 
sensibility people exercise and impose on the world. 1\vo obvious problems arise 
with this sort of approach. First, the idea that human society can or should be 
described naturalistically is highly questionable, and has not surprisingly, long 
been cop.tested in the history of social science. Sugden and others in this tradition 
generally do not explain why a natural science approach to social science might be 
plausible, and I am skeptical that any good arguments exist on this score. Second, 
this approach creates a very strong problem for making the transition from 'is' 
to 'ought' (thus Moore's naturalistic fallacy). Sugden addresses this problem by 
simply insisting on a re-definition of 'moral' in naturalistic terms. Whether this is 
a reasonable re-definition of 'moral', however, depends on whether the account 
of moral behavior that emerges on these terms captures what we ordinarily think 
is bound up with the normative. 
What is it, then, that is most characteristic of the normative domain? We can 
begin to answer this question by emphasizing the implied content of the moral 
'ought.' When 'ought' appears in an expression in a normative way, it indicates the 
presence of a moral obligation. If individuals do something because they believe 
they morally ought to, they do so out of a sense of moral obligation operating upon 
them. There are many ways ofunderstanding what this sense of 'ought' involves, 
but following Kant (1785 [1948]), I take the minimum essential idea to be a 
matter of doing so�ething because it is required irrespective of one's inclinations 
or desires. But then the idea of acting out of a sense of obligation is not what is 
involved in acting on a 'moral' sentiment. If one is motivated to respect a norm 
or convention, because one fears others' resentment or disapproval for failing 
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to do so, it is not a sense of obligation but an inclination that operates as one's 
motivation. Rather fear of others' resentment or disapproval has replaced acting 
out of a sense of obligation. The closest Sugden comes to referring to a sense of 
obligation, then, is when he argues that one of the virtues of his analysis is that 
it 'allows us to consider cases in which normative expectations and self-interest 
pull in opposite directions ... cases in which individuals follow cqnventions 
even though this. is contrary to self-interest' (Sudgen 1998, p. 83). But this is not 
evidence of acting out of a sense of obligation, since one might well be inclined 
to observe a convention that was contrary to self-interest. 
Thus if we take the idea of acting out of a sense of obligation to underlie 
what is involved in moral 'ought' thinking, a naturalistic, moral sentiments type 
of approach does not capture what we ordinarily think is bound up with the 
normative. This gives us good reason to conclude that the Lewis-Sugden type 
development of Hume regarding how values operate in organizations and institu­
tions as conventions is not an account of distinctively normative expectations. 
This in turn suggests that a naturalistic approach probably cannot explain how 
normative values arise and operate in organizations and institutions. Thus, since 
the Humean tradition derives from its starting point in the notion that individuals 
are naturalistically described as isolated from one another, and generally acting 
in their own interest, let us rather begin at a different starting point by describing 
individuals as embedded in social groups in the collective intentionality sense, and 
then ask how normative values might arise and operate in organizations and insti­
tutions. Two questions can be addressed. (1) Does this alternative strategy enable 
us to talk about what is most characteristic of the normative domain, namely, a 
sense of obligation that individuals have when they use 'ought' language? (2) 
Does this strategy provide us an account of the variety and range of different 
types of relationships between ·normative values in social life along the lines of 
Sen's 'deontic-value inclusive consequentialist' framework? 
Question 1: Moral obligation in organizations and institutions? 
The first question can be answered by explaining what must be involved in saying 
that socially embedded individuals, understood in a collective intentionality 
sense, have we-intentions as well as I-intentions. The.Humean framework, 
by taking individuals as fundamentally isolated from one another, operates 
exclusively with I-intentions. As previously argued, the use of 'we' language 
generally creates obligations for individuals - and not just in the moral sense. 
The collective intentionality framework, particularly as developed by Tuomela, 
shares with the Lewis-Sudgen account of convention the idea that individual 
expectations are established within a system of reciprocal expectations between 
individuals. But Tuomela's account is different in that individual expectations 
have as their object reciprocal sets of we-intentions rather than,have as their 
object the I-intentions implicitly involved in the Humean framework. We-
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intentions, as previously argued, create obligations for individuals, because the 
successful use of 'we' by an individual needs to conform to how others use that 
same 'we.' Outside of a requirement of using language correctly, this obligation 
does not exist for the use of 'I.' Of course some obligations which individuals 
recognize are pragmatic, and consequently do not have moral content. But on 
the interpretation here collective intentionality analysis is not naturalistic, and 
certainly not motivated by positivistic aims. Thus it is as reasonable to suppose 
that moral facts exist as to suppose that they do not. From this it follows that 
some of the obligations individuals ob�erve are indeed moral in nature. Though 
the dividing line between pragmatic and moral obligations may often be difficult 
to draw, and though it may change over time, it seems there are many clear 
cases of each, and thus fair to say that individuals who form we-intentions and 
use 'we' language often operate under a sense of moral obligation. 
So a collective intentionality framework, by operating with a conception of 
socially embedded individuals rather than atomistic ones, makes it possible to 
include a sense of moral obligation alongside individual inclination as a form of 
individual motivation. Turning to the second question above, then, what does the 
collective intentionality framework and the conception of individuals as socially 
embedded tell us about the range and variety of normative values in social life 
and the relationships between them? 
Question 2: An expanded normative domain? 
The emphasis on moral obligation thus far has rested on looking at moral 
obligation as something that particular individuals recognize. But a fuller 
characterization of the concept needs to see these obligations not just from 
the point of view of the individuals who have them, but also from the point of 
view of the individuals to whom they may'apply. This suggests a concept of 
moral obligation which relies on an 'extemalist' conception of the individual, 
where this is a matter of understanding individuals in terms of their relations 
to one another, in contrast to a concept of moral obligation which relies on an 
'lntemalist' conception of the individual, where this is a matter of understanding 
individuals in terms of properties that apply to them independently of their 
relations to one another (Davis, 2003). An example of the latter is the Pareto 
efficiency standard, which employs an 'intemalist' conception of the individual 
to explain normative recommendations that judge states of affairs according to 
whether one person is better off ceteris paribus all other individuals. 
Extemalist-individual normative concepts, it can be argued, just because they 
emphasize relationships between individuals, generally require that we give 
attention to a range of normative concepts that go beyond whatever particular 
normative concepts (say, regarding what is good) might constitute a particular 
individual's moral view. Thus to give any kind of detailed explanation of the moral 
obligations that one has to others, one typically also needs to have an understanding 
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of others' and one's own rights. But systems of rights are themselves generally 
embedded in broad social commitments to such ideals as freedom, equality, 
fairness, human dignity, community, justice, etc. Thus employing an externalist­
individual type of normative concept typically commits one to examining an 
entire range of accompanying normative concerns. This also means that the 
connections between different normative concerns cannot generally be mapped 
out with any high degree of precision, making moral questions complex and 
often ultimately undecidable. 
The idea of an expanded normative domain may be linked to a collective 
intentionality understanding of individuals' social embeddedness in terms of their 
involvements in social groups in the following way. Social groups generally have 
goals that help define them. Thus their members' we-intentions often concern 
a consequentialist type of moral reasoning, as when something is regarded as 
right on account of its helping bring about some outcome desired by the group. 
But this sort of consequentialist moral reasoning, when it is expressed in we­
intention terms, also has independent concepts of moral obligation associated with 
it. Thus a particular individual using 'we' language in regard to what potential 
good consequences a group wants to bring about operates both with an idea that 
what is right is a matter of bringing about the relevant outcome, and also the idea 
that what is right is a matter of observing obligations upon oneself understood 
in we-intentions terms. This latter sense of right may ru:aw in tum upon other 
ideals such as justice, equality, and dignity. This is one way of talking about a 
'deontic-value inclusive consequential reasoning,' in which, '[i]t is neither that 
"the good" comes first, and then "rights and duties", nor that rights and duties 
congeal first followed by the good, but that they are linked concepts that demand 
simultaneous consideration' (Sen 2001, p.437). 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter does not attempt to explain how instrumentally rational and 
deontologically rational economic behavior are coordinated. It does suggest, 
however, that this may in part depend upon the extent to which individuals are 
active in social group settings in which their behavior has an economic character, 
that is, where productiop, exchange, and consumption activities are engaged 
in. The standard view on the part of proponents of the atomistic individual 
conception is that behavior in groups can always in principle be decomposed 
into the behavior of instrumentally rational individuals. But this view has not 
stood up to scrutiny (cf. Kincaid, 1996), and in any case such arguments beg 
the central issue here, namely, that individuals act on we-intentions as well as 
on I-intentions. Thus the need to explain behavior as complex remains on the 
agenda. In closing I merely suggest a set of considerations that could figure in 
the way in which this issue might be addressed. 
I 
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One possible view is that one of the two spheres somehow determines the 
boundaries of the other. Thus social groups might establish certain domains of 
activity in which individuals would act in an instrumentally rational fashion. As 
in the example at the end of the third section, the practices in a business firm, or 
in a department of one, might be to collectively delegate to particular individuals 
the responsibility of acting as they would find rational, subject to their observing 
the boundaries placed on that domain of activity by the group. Alternatively, 
instrumentally rational individuals might delegate domains of activity in which 
group considerations were regarded �s primary. For example, were heads of 
households instrumentally rational in the market, they might nonetheless treat the 
household as a sphere in which customary relationships reflecting we-intentions 
would prevail. But this general model - one sphere determining the boundaries of 
the other - also suggests another model in which behavior in one sphere invades 
the boundaries and undermines the behavior of the other._ For example, individuals 
may express we-intentions deceitfully, and act in ways that are contrary to them. 
Alternatively, groups may seek to impose rules and norms on individuals where 
mutual beliefs are absent. 
One reason that instrumental rationality theory has been attractive in economics 
is that having a single model of analysis makes possible a high degree of logical 
and mathematical determinacy in economic explanation. But the consequences 
of achieving this precision are that certain types of behavior go unexplained, 
and possibly that the activity of individuals that is meant to be explained is 
misrepresented. Collectj.ve intentionality analysis constitutes one framework in 
which these risks might be avoided. The implication of this chapter is that a larger 
framework including that analysis which presupposes that economic behavior is 
complex is more likely to offer a more adequate account of economic behavior 
on both counts. 
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Notes 
1. A similar argument regarding the economic consequences of social proximity was made by
Adam Smith, though he relied on sympathy rather than shared intentions as the underlying
motive force.
2. Gilbert explains 'we' language in a similar way: 'A person X's full-blooded use of"we" in "Shall
we do A?" with respect to Y, Z, and himself, is appropriate if and only if it expresses his recognition
of the fact that he and the others are jointly ready to share in doing A in relevant circumstances'
(1989, p.199). Gilbert holds that individuals use of 'we' language constitutes a 'plural subject'
(1989, pp.199fl).
3. Tuomela draws on an account of mutual belief that has become fairly standard among philosophers
which relies on the idea of a hierarchical set of beliefs iterated across individuals (Tuomela 1995,
pp.4 lfl). See Shwayder (1965, p. 257) and Lewis (1969, pp. 52ft) for early formulations.
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4. For one example of how such an explanation might be produced, see Minkler (1999), where a
'commitment function' is added to a standard utility function representation of individual behavior. 
The individual is said to engage in a two-step iterative procedure with the first step corresponding
to a response to group requirements and the second step corresponding to an instrumentally
rational maximization of utility.
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